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PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION IN AFRICA:
TOWARDS COMPLIANCE WITH THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT
P C∗
I
Plant variety protection has come to the fore in the wake of the adoption of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement). TRIPS generally imposes the patentability of inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology and specifically mandates the
introduction of a form of legal protection on plant varieties. Article 27.3(b) thus
states that member states “shall provide for the protection of plant varieties
either by patents or by an eﬀective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof.”1
The introduction of plant variety protection in African countries is a novelty
for all but a few states. It constitutes a significant departure from previous
practice which generally emphasized the free sharing of knowledge at all levels.
The challenge is further compounded by the fact that plant variety protection
has until now only been introduced in countries with relatively small but
highly industrialized agricultural sectors. African countries, like other developing
countries in the same situation, must thus innovate in this field. Some of the
problems they have encountered on the road to developing plant variety
protection regimes have been the time pressure forced upon them by TRIPS
implementation deadlines and the pressure brought upon them to adopt an
existing plant variety protection regime developed mainly for OECD countries.
African countries have generally been slow in taking up the challenge of
devising plant variety protection, partly because of the prevalence of more urgent
issues requiring their attention. Further, all the least developed countries in the
region have until 2006 to implement their obligations. Given this background,
this article analyses developments in India where significant debates have taken
place concerning the introduction of plant variety protection. The Indian situation
is rich in lessons for African countries because there are significant similarities
in their agricultural sectors, because the debate in India predates the signature
of the TRIPS Agreement, and because there has been a comparatively strong
input from the civil society into the debate on the introduction of intellectual
property rights in agriculture.
This article focuses on the implementation of plant variety protection as part
of the obligations that African states have to undertake under TRIPS. It does
not debate whether the introduction of plant variety protection is warranted. In
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1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in General Agreement on
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principle, sharing knowledge seems to be most appropriate to agricultural
management in most sub-Saharan countries. However, it is necessary to analyse
the situation brought about by TRIPS and the need for African states to fulfil
their obligations under this treaty. This article argues that African states should
take advantage of the opportunity they have to devise a property rights system
adapted to their needs and conditions and they should avoid any system involving
the introduction of monopoly or exclusionary rights, such as patents or plant
breeders’ rights. This is due to the fact that the introduction of such rights in
agriculture does not seem to provide the conditions necessary to ensure the
fulfilment of basic food needs for all individuals and the sustainable management
of biological resources in African countries.
L  I F
Plant variety protection through intellectual property rights has been a
contentious issue for a long time and plant varieties were traditionally excluded
from patentability at the international level. Some countries and regions
progressively introduced plant variety protection in the course of the twentieth
century, but it was generally felt that granting patents was not appropriate in
this field.2 Recent developments in the context of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) have heralded a major shift towards the imposition of plant variety
protection in most countries of the world. This section highlights the main
international treaties and policies relevant in the field of plant variety protection
and identifies some of the initiatives taken in Africa at the regional and domestic
levels towards the setting up of plant variety protection regimes.
Property rights over plant varieties at the international level
The international regime concerning the protection of plant varieties has
evolved significantly over the past few decades. Before turning to the main
treaties and institutions dealing with these issues, a few general remarks are in
order. First, the regime is marked by a variety of instruments whose subject
matter may diﬀer. Thus, while the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
covers all biological resources, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources (International Undertaking) is only concerned with plant genetic
resources. Second, the diﬀerent treaties belong to diﬀerent areas of international
law, such as environmental law and trade law. While there is theoretically no
hierarchy between these various fields, in practice, WTO-related instruments
carry more weight than environmental treaties because of the threat of sanctions.
Third, the property rights regimes set up in the diﬀerent instruments do not
necessarily add up to form a coherent whole. Indeed, while one can identify a
trend towards the privatization of plant genetic resources over the past two
decades, one also finds a continuous emphasis on the sovereign rights of states
over their natural resources generally.
2 On the development of plant variety protection in the US and Europe, see generally G. Van
Overwalle, “Patent protection for plants: A comparison of American and European approaches”,
39 IDEA: J.L. & Tech. 143 (1999).
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The TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement generally provides for the introduction of intellectual
property standards already in place in most OECD countries to all WTO
member states. In the field of patents, it requires that patents should be
available for inventions in all fields of technology. It also specifically requires the
introduction of plant variety protection but does not impose their protection
through patents. Indeed, article 27.3(b) specifically allows member states to devise
alternative property rights systems to implement their obligations in this field.
This reflects debates concerning the appropriateness of imposing patents on
plant varieties, and constitutes one of the relatively few cases in the TRIPS
Agreement where states have a certain margin of appreciation in implementing
their obligations.3 TRIPS constitutes the trigger for the development of plant
variety protection legislation in most African countries, but does not provide
precise guidance concerning possible alternative property rights systems that can
be developed.
Article 27.3(b) is significant in the context of TRIPS. First, while it imposes
the introduction of plant variety protection, it does not force member states to
introduce patents. Second, article 27.3(b) is in eﬀect a diﬀerential provision
which is meant to accommodate developing countries’ needs since it provides
an exception to the general rule under article 27.1 requiring patentability in all
fields. Indeed, while most OECD countries had adopted some form of plant
variety protection before 1994, most developing countries had not. Third, the
sui generis option oﬀered in the case of plant varieties could be a model for a
number of other areas, particularly in pharmaceuticals, where there is growing
dissatisfaction in a number of countries with the regime proposed in TRIPS at
the moment.
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) is the only international treaty focusing on plant variety protection. It
was first adopted in 1961 by a group of Western European nations with the
specific aim of introducing private property rights on plant varieties.4 This
followed pressure from the private sector, which argued that the lack of intellectual
property rights in this field threatened their development. It was, however, felt
at the time that the introduction of patents in agriculture would be inappropriate
due to the prevalent practices of free exchange of seeds and knowledge among
farmers.5
Even though UPOV did not introduce patents, it sought from the outset to
provide incentives to the private sector to engage in commercial plant breeding
through the provision of plant breeders’ rights. More specifically, the Convention
recognizes the rights of individual plant breeders who have developed or
discovered plant varieties which are new, distinct, uniform and stable. On the
other hand, the Convention recognizes what is known as the farmer’s privilege.
3 See, e.g., D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement—Drafting, History and Analysis (London, 1998). The
TRIPS Agreement provides for other exceptions to patentability at arts. 27.2 and 27.3.
4 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Paris, 2 December,
1961, as revised at Geneva on 10 November, 1972, 23 October, 1978, and 19 March, 1991 (Geneva:
UPOV, UPOV Doc. 221(E), 1996).
5 See, e.g., J.-P. Clavier, Les cate´gories de la proprie´te´ intellectuelle a` l’e´preuve des cre´ations ge´ne´tiques (Paris,
1998).
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Thus, under the 1978 version of the Convention, farmers are permitted to re-
use propagating material from the previous year’s harvest and can freely exchange
seeds of protected varieties with other farmers. Plant breeders are also allowed
to use the protected variety in order to breed and commercialize other new
varieties.
The latest revision of the Convention adopted in 1991 has further strengthened
the rights of commercial plant breeders. This includes the obligation for member
states to provide protection to all plant genera and species. Further, it extends
breeders’ rights to all seed production of a protected variety even though states
can decide otherwise at the national level. In some cases, it also grants commercial
breeders rights to the harvested material of the variety and extends the protection
to varieties that are “essentially derived” from a protected variety. Overall, in
the 1991 version, plant breeders’ rights have become akin to weakened patents
and the conceptual distinction between the two is now blurred.
Membership of the UPOV Convention has grown over time but until recently
it consisted mainly of developed countries. Only a few developing countries,
mainly from Latin America, have joined the UPOV,6 but its influence is more
prevalent than a strict head count of member states would suggest, since a
number of countries have adopted or are in the process of adopting legislations
based on the UPOV model. Over the past few years, there has been significant
pressure on developing countries to adopt UPOV as a sui generis plant variety
protection system. Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement implies that UPOV is an
alternative to patent rights. Indeed, UPOV provides weaker monopoly rights
than patents but plant breeders’ rights are based on exactly the same premises.
Further, given that countries can now only join the 1991 version of the
Convention, which has significantly weakened the exceptions to the rights of
breeders contained in the 1978 version, there is no significant diﬀerence between
patents and the regime oﬀered by UPOV.
The International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
The International Undertaking was adopted by the FAO Conference as a
non-binding instrument.7 It aﬃrms the principle that plant genetic resources are
a heritage of humankind that should be made available without restriction to
anyone. This covers not only traditional cultivars and wild species but also
varieties developed by scientists in laboratories. This encompassing conception
of access proved to be unacceptable to some developed countries. Broader
acceptance of the International Undertaking was only achieved after interpretative
resolutions were adopted. These resolutions aﬃrm the sovereign rights of countries
over their plant genetic resources and qualify the principle of free availability
by recognizing plant breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights.8 This recognition of
private property rights implies the right to compensation for access to biological
resources and associated products.9
6 In Africa, only South Africa and Kenya are members.
7 International Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resource, Res. 8/83, Report of the Conference of FAO,
22nd Sess., Rome 5–23 November, 1983, Doc. C83/REP.
8 Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking, Res. 4/89, Report of the Conference of FAO,
25th Sess., Rome 11–29 November, 1989, Doc. C89/REP.
9 See, e.g., Revision of the International Undertaking, Mandate, Context, Background and
Proposed Process, Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, First Extraordinary Sess., Rome, 7–11
November, 1994, Doc. CPGR-Ex1/94/3.
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Further revision of the International Undertaking has been prompted by the
growing importance of biological resources at the international level and the
coming into force of the CBD, which raised the need to harmonize relevant
provisions of the two regimes.10 Some of the most contentious issues in the
negotiations have been the drafting of the provision on access to biological
resources and on farmers’ rights. The draft article on farmers’ rights focuses on
the protection of traditional knowledge, the equitable sharing of benefits arising
from the exploitation of biological resources and the right to participate in
decision-making.11 It emphasizes mainly the farmers’ contribution to agricultural
management and not their entitlements. The draft text also introduces a
multilateral system to facilitate access to genetic resources and to foster the
sharing of benefits arising from their utilization. It recognizes, for instance, that
no monopoly right will be sought by recipients of resources received under this
multilateral system.
The Convention on Biological Diversity
The CBD does not deal specifically with the issue of plant variety protection
but is of direct relevance to the setting up of protection regimes for plant varieties
since its scope encompasses all biological resources. Generally, it constitutes the
central instrument concerning biodiversity at the international level. In this
context, it broadly delimits the rights of states and other relevant actors over
biological resources. It generally aﬃrms the sovereign rights of states to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, a direct
reflection of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.12
The sovereign rights of states over their biological resources are limited by the
recognition that these resources are a common concern of humankind.
The Convention also provides a broad framework for member states’ policies
concerning access, development and transfer of technologies. Further, it
acknowledges the necessity for all parties to recognize and protect intellectual
property rights in this field. The Convention further recognizes both the
dependence of local communities on biological resources and the roles that these
communities play in the conservation and sustainable use of the resources. It
points to the need for equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of their
traditional knowledge, innovations and practices, relevant to the conservation of
biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components.13
The introduction of plant variety protection in the context of the TRIPS
Agreement cannot be dissociated from the CBD. Indeed, the Convention provides
the broad framework within which property rights over plant varieties must fit.
Further, it is, for instance, impossible to conceive a plant variety protection
regime separately from the property rights system to be devised concerning
traditional knowledge. While the two issues do not fully overlap, there are
significant commonalities.
10 Res. 7/93, Revision of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Report of the
Conference of the FAO, 27th Sess., Rome 6–24 November, 1993, Doc. C93/REP.
11 Composite Draft Text of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Commission
on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Third Inter-sessional Meeting of the Contact Group,
2000, Doc. CGRFA/CG-3/00/2.
12 See art. 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June, 1992, reprinted
in 31 Int’l Legal Mat. 818 (1992) [hereafter CBD].
13 See Preamble §12 and art. 8( j) of the CBD, above, n. 12.
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The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is
an important player in the management of genetic resources used to meet food
needs. It holds significant ex situ germplasm collections which represent about
40 per cent of unique food crop germplasm.14 The ex situ collections held by the
various International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) have traditionally
been freely accessible.15 In a changing international environment characterized
by the progressive move towards the establishment of sovereign and private
property rights over biological resources, the CGIAR has had to rethink its
position with regard to property rights, in particular intellectual property rights.16
The new guiding principles on intellectual property seek to harmonize the
CGIAR’s core principles that the designated germplasm it holds is held in trust
for the world community with the recognition of various forms of property rights,
including sovereign rights, farmers’ rights and private rights.17 In principle,
the Centres neither apply intellectual property protection to their designated
germplasm nor do they require recipients to observe the same conditions. The
Centres also refrain from asserting intellectual property rights over the products
of their research. An exception to this rule is made in case the assertion of
intellectual property rights may facilitate the transfer of technology or otherwise
protect developing countries’ interests. The CGIAR also requires that any
intellectual property rights on the Centres’ output will be assigned to the Centre
and not to an individual. While the guiding principles generally seek to contain
to some extent the monopoly elements of intellectual property rights such as
patents, plant breeders’ rights are specifically welcomed. Recipients of germplasm
can apply for plant breeders’ rights as long as this does not prevent others from
using the original materials in their own breeding programmes.
Developments in Africa
The obligation to introduce plant variety protection as required by the
TRIPS Agreement has elicited attention from African countries. However, the
development of alternatives to monopoly rights has not been given much
prominence. While least developed countries still have several years to implement
their TRIPS obligations and can use the coming five years to devise regimes
adapted to their needs and conditions, other countries had to implement their
obligations by 1 January, 2000. It is striking that, to date, the most common
response throughout the continent has been to accept the UPOV Convention
as a form of plant variety protection instead of devising an alternative to
monopoly rights.
14 Gigi Manicad, “CGIAR and the private sector: public good versus proprietary technology in
agricultural research”, 37 Biotechnology & Dev. Monitor 8 (1999).
15 See, e.g., Agreement Between the IPGRI/INIBAP and the FAO Placing Collections of Plant
Germplasm Under the Auspices of FAO, 26 Oct., 1994.
16 Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, Progress Report on IPR Matters
and Proposal for Review of Plant Breeding, Mid-Term Meeting, 1999, Beijing, CGIAR Doc. MTM/
99/20.
17 See Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, CGIAR Center Statements
on Genetic Resources, Intellectual Property Rights, and Biotechnology (1999).
Vol. 45, No. 1 Plant Variety Protection in Africa 103
Regional frameworks
Of the two regional intellectual property organizations, only the French-
speaking African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) has dealt with plant
variety protection directly. OAPI member states agreed to a revision of the
Bangui Convention in 1999. The new text commits them to adhere to the 1991
version of the UPOV Convention.18 This constitutes an unexpected choice for
two reasons. A majority of OAPI member states fall in the least developed
country grouping, which does not have to implement their WTO obligations
until 2006. They could thus have given themselves another six years to devise
their own plant variety protection legislation. Further, there was not only no
obligation to join UPOV to fulfil the requirements of article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS
Agreement, but also no obligation to join the more stringent UPOV 1991. It is
striking that the only limits placed on monopoly rights on plant varieties in the
convention are found in a provision denying patentability on plant varieties,
animal species and essentially biological processes for the breeding of plants and
animals.19 While member states only commit themselves to joining UPOV in
the future, the Convention already provides a plant variety protection regime
which has been found to be in conformity with the 1991 version of the convention
by the UPOV Council.20
Member states of the African Regional Industrial Property Organization
(ARIPO) have not dealt specifically with the issue of plant variety protection
following the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Further, the current patent
regime put in place by the Protocol on patents does not oﬀer useful guidance.
Indeed, the Protocol does not provide for any substantive restriction to patenting.21
ARIPO leaves member states free to reject patents granted on grounds found
in domestic law but does not itself provide any framework within which
patentability must fall. ARIPO examines whether the criteria of novelty,
inventiveness and industrial applicability are met. There are no other conditions
to be met.
The only regional eﬀort at defining a regime concerning biological resources
is the model legislation developed in the context of the Organization of African
States (OAU).22 The model law deals with access to biological resources, benefit
sharing, and the rights of farmers and breeders over their knowledge and
resources. It is premised on the rejection of patents of life or the exclusive
appropriation of any life form, including derivatives. Its provisions on access to
biological resources make it clear that the recipients of biological resources or
related knowledge cannot apply for any intellectual property right of exclusionary
nature. The model law focuses mainly on the definition of the rights of
communities, farmers and breeders. Community rights recognized include rights
18 See Agreement to Revise the Bangui Agreement on the Creation of an African Intellectual
Property Organization of 2 March, 1977, Bangui, 24 February, 1999 [hereafter Bangui Agreement].
19 See Annex 1 of the Bangui Agreement, above, n. 18.
20 See Annex 10 of the Bangui Agreement, above, n. 18, and International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Examination of the Conformity of the Bangui Agreement on
the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization with the UPOV Convention, UPOV
Council, Seventeenth Extraordinary Session, Geneva, 7 April, 2000, Doc. C(Extr.)/17/3.
21 See Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs Within the Framework of the African Regional
Industrial Property Organization, Harare, 2 December, 1982.
22 See African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers
and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources (2000) [hereafter African
Model Legislation].
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over their biological resources and the right to collectively benefit from their
use, rights to their innovations, practices, knowledge and technology and the
right to collectively benefit from their utilization. In practice, these rights allow
communities the right to prohibit access to their resources and knowledge, but
only in cases where access would be detrimental to the integrity of their natural
or cultural heritage.23 Further, the state is to ensure that at least fifty per cent
of the benefits derived from the utilization of their resources or knowledge is
channelled back to the communities. The rights of farmers are slightly more
precisely defined. These include the protection of their traditional knowledge
relevant to plant and animal genetic resources, the right to an equitable share
of benefits arising from the use of plant and animal genetic resources, the right
to participate in making decisions on matters related to the conservation and
sustainable use of plant and animal genetic resources, the right to save, use,
exchange and sell farm-saved seed or propagating material, and the right to use
a commercial breeder’s variety to develop other varieties. The breeders’ rights
defined under the model law generally follow the definition given in the UPOV
Convention and the duration of the rights is, for instance, modelled after UPOV
1991. The noteworthy characteristic of the plant breeders’ rights regime under
the model law is the rather broad scope of the exemptions granted. Exemptions
to the rights of breeders include the right to use a protected variety for purposes
other than commerce, the right to sell plant or propagating material as food,
the right to sell within the place where the variety is grown and the use of the
variety as an initial source of variation for developing another variety.24
Domestic frameworks
Generally, only a few African countries have already implemented plant
variety protection regimes in conformity with their TRIPS obligations. The 24
countries that are classified as least developed countries do not have to implement
their TRIPS obligations until 2006. However, other countries should have put
legislations in place by 1 January, 2000. Some countries, such as Kenya, South
Africa and Zimbabwe had introduced plant variety protection regimes before
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, but these countries constitute exceptions.
Most other countries did not have plant variety protection regimes in place
before 1995. Further, some of them, such as Tanzania, specifically excluded
patentability for plant varieties.25 Even in cases where plant breeders’ rights are
being introduced, exclusions to patentability remain in favour. In Kenya, the
proposed amendments to the Industrial Property Bill specifically reject the
patentability of plant varieties even though it provides that parts of plant varieties
and products of biotechnological processes are patentable.26 It is significant that
the rejection of patents on plant varieties is not akin to a rejection of monopoly
rights in general on plant varieties.
Among the countries that had to implement plant variety protection regimes
by 1 January, 2000, progress has generally been slow in drafting and implementing
legislation, and the deadline has passed with most still in the process of adopting
the necessary regimes. Kenya, however, has been an exception to this trend
23 Art. 20 of the African Model Legislation, above, n. 22.
24 Art. 43 of the African Model Legislation, above, n. 22.
25 S. 7 of the Tanzanian Patents Act, 1987.
26 See s. 26 of the Kenyan Industrial Property Bill, 2000.
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through its decision to ratify the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention in early
1999. Further, Kenya had already introduced plant variety protection in 1972
as part of the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act.27 The Act focused both on the
regulation of the production, testing, certification and marketing of seeds and
on the introduction of plant breeders’ rights. The plant variety regime was
modelled after the UPOV Convention and included, for instance, the same
conditions for the granting of plant breeders’ rights, namely the criteria of
distinctiveness, uniformity and stability.28 The rights were granted for a period
of up to 25 years and gave the breeders exclusive rights to produce the propagating
material of the variety for commercial purposes, to commercialize it, to oﬀer it
for sale or to export it.29 Despite the existence of a plant variety protection
regime on the books, the law was only implemented with regard to the certification
of seeds.30 It is only in 1994 that regulations were adopted which led to the
establishment of a Plant Breeders’ Rights Oﬃce. Given the prior existence of a
plant variety protection regime based on UPOV 1961, Kenya’s application for
membership of UPOV 1978 has implied only minor legislative changes in the
existing law.
While plant variety legislations constitute the central element of a plant variety
protection regime at the domestic level, they are not the only relevant pieces of
legislation. Indeed, in a number of cases, other biodiversity related laws also
deal with property rights over biological resources and related knowledge. In a
number of cases, these laws give pointers concerning property rights for actors
other than formal breeders, which have been in most cases the focus of plant
variety protection laws. Thus, the new Kenyan Act provides that the authority
established under the Act is mandated to protect the indigenous property rights
of local communities in respect of biological diversity.31 The Act also deals more
generally with the management of genetic resources and specifies that this has
to be done for the benefit of the people of Kenya. The draft regulations
concerning access to genetic resources have interpreted this provision to imply
that all plant genetic materials, in their natural condition or deposited in a gene
bank, are vested in the Government of Kenya, which holds them in trust for
present and future generations of Kenyans.32 Similarly, the draft Ugandan access
and benefit-sharing regulations determine that the right to regulate access to
biological resources is vested in the government for the benefit of the people.33
While access and benefit-sharing regimes are not supposed to be related to the
introduction of monopoly rights on plant varieties, in practice there is a very
strong link. Indeed, the development of benefit-sharing schemes is often directly
linked to the dichotomy between actors that benefit from entitlements and actors
that do not benefit from property rights. In practice, the need for benefit sharing
arises, for example, when commercial plant breeders get exclusive rights while
27 Seeds and Plant Varieties Act, Laws of Kenya, cap. 326.
28 See Fourth Schedule, Seeds and Plant Varieties Act, Laws of Kenya, cap. 326.
29 Art. 20 of the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act, Laws of Kenya, cap 326.
30 See World Trade Organization, The Relationship Between the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS); With a Focus on Article 27.3(b), WTO Doc. IP/C/W/175, 11 May, 2000.
31 S. 50 of the Kenyan Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, 1999.
32 Art. 3.1 of the Kenyan Draft Environmental Management and Coordination Access to Plant
Genetic Material Regulations, 1999.
33 See Draft Ugandan National Environment (Access to Biological Resources and Benefit Sharing)
Regulations, 2000.
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farmers’ varieties are held to be in the public domain. In this situation, benefit-
sharing schemes are put in place as a form of compensation for the absence of
property rights.
T C  S G P V P S
The TRIPS Agreement gives member states the possibility to devise their own
plant variety protection system. A number of conceptual and practical arguments
militate in favour of this exception for most developing countries. This section
first outlines why the introduction of monopoly rights such as patents or plant
breeders’ rights does not seem appropriate for most sub-Saharan countries in
practice, and then focuses on some conceptual issues which also militate against
the imposition of monopoly rights in agriculture. This provides the basis for the
development of sui generis plant variety protection regimes.
Agricultural management and monopoly rights
Agriculture in Africa is an activity of primary importance. This is due to the
fact that a majority of the population classified as economically active works in
this sector and that agriculture remains an important economic activity. Aggregate
figures do not necessarily reflect the full importance of this sector in most
countries. Indeed, while in Libya only 7 per cent of the population is engaged
in agriculture, the figure is above two-thirds in a number of sub-Saharan
countries. Thus, 92 per cent of the population of Burkina Faso, 76 per cent of
the population of Kenya and 74 per cent of Senegal’s population find employment
in the primary sector.34 Further, agriculture’s contribution to the GDP can be
very substantial, reaching 26 per cent in Kenya, 32 per cent in Nigeria, 42 per
cent in Cameroon and 50 per cent in Ethiopia.35 Indeed, agriculture is, for
instance, the most important economic sector in Kenya.36 The importance of
the primary sector is reinforced by the fact that a majority of the population of
sub-Saharan countries lives in rural areas. Rural population accounts for 54 per
cent in Senegal, 58 per cent in Nigeria, 74 per cent in Tanzania and 86 per
cent in Uganda.37
Seed management in African countries is largely carried out by farmers.
Indeed, farm-saved seeds account for about 80 per cent of farmers’ total seed
requirements.38 These proportions are even higher in some cases. Thus, in
Ethiopia, farmers contribute about 96 per cent of the annual seed requirement,
while in Tanzania only 2 per cent of the maize crop is planted with purchased
certified seeds.39 Further, even when farmers buy seeds for the crops they market,
they usually continue to cultivate local food crops.40 Traditionally, agricultural
management has been built around significant sharing of knowledge and resources
34 FAO, FAO Yearbook—Production, Vol. 52, 1998 (Rome: FAO, 1999).
35 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000 (New York, 2000).
36 See, e.g., Central Bank of Kenya, Monthly Economic Review (Dec. 1999).
37 United Nations Development Programme, above, n. 35.
38 Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity—Access to Genetic Resources
and Benefit-Sharing (London, 1999).
39 See, e.g., Privatization of the Seed Industry in the West Asia and North African Region (Deutsche
Gesellschaft fu¨r Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 1997) and Esbern Friis-Hansen, “Tanzania’s
forgotten farmers”, Seedling 6 (Dec. 1999).
40 See E. Friis-Hansen, The Socio-Economic Dynamics of Farmers’ Management of Local Plant Genetic
Resources (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1999).
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at all levels. This is, for instance, reflected today in the fact that African countries
are highly dependent on genetic resources from other regions of the world for
their main food crops. Indeed, the dependency ratio is generally high.41 Their
position is not at all extraordinary since most countries of the world are highly
dependent on genetic diversity from other areas for their main food crops.
The introduction of patents or monopoly rights in sub-Saharan African
agriculture is diﬃcult to analyse because the experience of OECD countries
having introduced plant variety protection does not constitute an appropriate
guide. This is due to the fact that present conditions in African agriculture diﬀer
markedly from the conditions in Europe when the UPOV convention was first
adopted. Limited lessons can be learnt from the experience of Kenya and
Zimbabwe, which already have plant variety protection regimes in place. In
both cases, the introduction of plant variety protection has not substantially
fostered the development of new food crops. On the contrary, in Kenya, out of
136 applications filed and tested since 1997, only one was a food crop while
most concerned cash crops such as ornamentals or sugarcane and more than
half concerned rose varieties.42 In Zimbabwe, data available for the period 1977
to 1999 shows that fewer than 40 per cent of the applications were for food
crops.43 Further, the introduction of plant breeders’ rights does not seem to
promote the development of indigenous research capacity. In Kenya, between
1997 and 1999, 91 per cent of the applications came from foreign institutions,
while in South Africa 72 per cent of applicants in 1997 were foreign.44
While there is only limited data to judge the impact of the introduction of
monopoly rights in sub-Saharan Africa, a useful comparison can be made with
the impact of the green revolution, for which substantial information is now
available. African countries on the whole did not constitute a major focus of the
green revolution, and one thus has to turn to the experience of Asian countries
to understand its impact. The green revolution was in many respects similar to
the introduction of genetically engineered seeds protected by monopoly rights
today. It was meant to dramatically increase the yields of some of the staple
crops in developing countries, and generally focused on the introduction of
varieties requiring the application of a number of external inputs, from irrigation
to large doses of chemical fertilizers and chemicals.
On the whole, green revolution areas witnessed significant yield increases.45
However, despite these gains, the green revolution package has come under
increasing criticism in the last decade.46 First, while crop output has significantly
increased in the short term, the green revolution has come to be associated with
significant environmental costs. These include falling water tables due to the
overuse of tubewells,47 waterlogged and saline soils from many large irrigation
schemes, declining soil fertility with excessive chemical fertilizer use and water
41 See generally, Ximena Flores Palacios/Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, Contribution to the Estimation of Countries’ Interdependence in the Area of Plant
Genetic Resources (Background Study Paper No. 7 Rev.1, 1997).
42 See WTO Doc. IP/C/W/175, above, n. 30, and GRAIN, “Plant variety protection to feed
Africa?”, 16/4 Seedling 2 (1999).
43 See Plant Variety Protection to Feed Africa? Rhetoric versus Reality (Barcelona: GRAIN, 1999).
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., R. Sharma and T.T. Poleman, The New Economics of India’s Green Revolution—Income and
Employment Diﬀusion in Uttar Pradesh (Delhi, 1994),
46 See, e.g., V. Shiva, The Violence of Green Revolution (London, 1991).
47 See, e.g., L. Bavadam, “Retrograde Development”, 17/11 Frontline 73 (2000).
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pollution with pesticides.48 The green revolution has also been associated with
the spread of monocultures which lead to a homogenization of species, greater
vulnerability to insect pests and diseases, and to a loss of agro-biodiversity.49
Second, the sustainability of the yield increases has been questioned in view of
evidence of diminishing returns on intensive production with new varieties.50
Third, the application of the new technique necessitates important investments
in seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation, which are beyond the resources of
all but the biggest farmers.51 Indeed, new varieties perform well only when all
the necessary inputs are available in suﬃcient quantities.52 Thus, irrigation is
often necessary given that crops may fail if water is not provided in suﬃcient
quantity at the opportune time. Uniformly produced seeds may also not be as
well adapted to local conditions as farm-produced seeds. Further, new seeds
tend to be much more expensive than farm-saved seeds.53 More generally, there
is increasing apprehension that the focus on quantitative increases may be
inappropriate to solve hunger. In this regard, the performance of India is
noteworthy. While the country is now more than self-suﬃcient in the aggregate,
hundreds of millions of people still go hungry every day. It thus seems that
quantitative increases in yield only constitute one of the factors to alleviate
hunger. It is now acknowledged that a more eﬀective response to malnutrition
lies in land redistribution.54
It is significant that the introduction of the green revolution was premised on
principles which diﬀer completely from the rationale for the introduction of
patents on plant varieties.55 Indeed, green revolution varieties were the outcome
of public research eﬀorts based on the principle of free exchange of germplasm
with a view to fostering food security across the world. The promoters of the
green revolution did not specifically promote commercial exploitation for profit.
In the case of the introduction of patented varieties, the private sector is not
directly concerned with food security but mainly with profits, one of the major
incentives for its participation being the availability of patents or plant breeders’
rights. Despite the diﬀerent premises, a number of lessons can be learnt from
the experience accumulated over the past three decades. This is due to the fact
that in practice, while the motives may be diﬀerent, the eﬀects are broadly
similar.56 The green revolution package, like the introduction of patented varieties,
focuses on monocultures and on yield enhancement. Further, they both lead to
the diminution of the farmer’s ability to save seeds. In the case of green revolution
48 See, e.g., B. Agarwal, Gender, Environment and Poverty Interlinks in Rural India 7 (Geneva: UNRISD,
1995) and G.S. Dhaliwal and V.K. Dilawari, “Impact of green revolution on environment”, in B.S.
Hansra and A.N. Shukla (eds.), Social, Economic and Political Implications of Green Revolution in India (New
Delhi, 1991).
49 See, e.g., L.A. Thrupp, “Linking agricultural biodiversity and food security: The valuable role
of agrobiodiversity for sustainable agriculture”, 76 Int’l Aﬀ. 265 (2000).
50 See, e.g., G.R. Conway and E.B. Barbier, After the Green Revolution—Sustainable Agriculture for
Development (London, 1990).
51 See, e.g., B.H. Joshi, An Analytical Approach to Problems of Indian Agriculture: A Theoretical and System
Approach (New Delhi: 1992).
52 See, e.g., Conway and Barbier, above, n. 50.
53 See, e.g., C.G. Kahama, Tanzania into the 21st Century (Dar es Salaam, 1995).
54 See, e.g., P. Rosset et al, “Lessons from the green revolution—do we need new technology to
end hunger?”, 15 Tikkun 52 (2000).
55 See, e.g., R. Paarlberg, Agrobiotechnology Choices in Developing Countries (Science, Technology and
Innovation Discussion Paper No. 1, Harvard: Center for International Development, 1999).
56 Cf. L.L. Jackson, “Agricultural industrialization and the loss of biodiversity”, in L.D. Guruswamy
and J.A. McNeely (eds.), Protection of Global Diversity: Converging Strategies 66 (Durham, NC, 1998).
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seeds, farmers are not technically bound to purchase new seeds each year, but
the yield of saved seeds is clearly much lower even in later years. This constitutes
a very strong incentive for yearly purchases. In the case of patented varieties,
farmers are not supposed to replant saved seeds. In practice most small farmers
in African countries will be able to carry on the practice of saving seeds because
litigation with millions of small farmers by seed companies is simply not feasible
unless the companies produce seeds for staple foods with the so-called terminator
technology.57 Generally, the main lesson of the green revolution for the
development of plant variety protection in developing countries is that a focus
on yields alone may not be appropriate for environmental and socio-economic
reasons. If the availability of food in more than suﬃcient quantities in India has
not led to the disappearance of malnutrition, there is a need to look beyond to
the structural problems that impede a better distribution of existing food supplies.
The allocation of property rights seems to provide one of the major elements in
this equation. In this context, while the question of land rights and distribution
remains absolutely fundamental, the allocation of property rights over knowledge
is not of any lesser importance.
Shortcomings of monopoly rights in agriculture
While the previous section has highlighted some of the practical problems
linked to the introduction of monopoly rights in agriculture, a number of
conceptual issues must also be analysed. As noted, agriculture was traditionally
kept outside the purview of the patent system. This exclusion was premised on
elements of public morality, the need to foster innovations at all levels from the
smallest farmer to multinational companies, and the need to keep sectors dealing
with the most basic needs of humankind such as food and health outside the
purview of the patents system so as to avoid the over-commercialization of these
sectors. In principle, monopoly rights on plant varieties do not diﬀer from other
monopoly rights. However, the agricultural sector holds a special place in the
economy because it provides for most of the food needs of all human beings.
Further, in most sub-Saharan countries, subsistence agriculture remains
dominant. In this situation, it is impossible to assume that farmers innovate only
to make a monetary profit. Indeed, even when local knowledge is protected, for
instance, by being restricted or secret, it is usually not the case that this is done
exclusively for commercial reasons.58
Generally, monopoly rights are likely to have a number of impacts on farmers’
agricultural practices and farmers’ lives in sub-Saharan countries. First, they
have the potential to conflict with established agricultural management practices
of small farmers. This is due to the fact that the two systems rely on and promote
diﬀerent knowledge systems, identify innovations diﬀerently and reward inventors
in diﬀerent ways. In fact, while the reward system established by monopoly rights
is mainly financial, local management practices do not concentrate exclusively on
financial incentives for innovation. The conflict between the diﬀerent systems is,
for instance, apparent in the definition of plant breeders’ rights. A variety tended
by farmers stands virtually no chance of meeting the conditions laid down by
57 See, e.g., US Patent 5,723,765, Control of Plant Gene Expression, issued 3 March, 1998.
58 See, e.g., N. Roht-Arriaza, “Of seeds and shamans: the appropriation of the scientific and
technological knowledge of indigenous and local communities”, 17 Michigan J. Int’l L. 919 (1996).
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the UPOV Convention to define novelty and farmers can therefore not be
recognized as breeders.59 This explains why the UPOV system is criticized for
only rewarding breeders who make it a business to develop seeds, while the
majority of farmers’ innovations are excluded from legal protection.
More generally, the problem is that monopoly rights do not recognize the
scientific or technical knowledge of farmers and other local actors as scientific
knowledge worthy of protection.60 Consequently, it is assumed that knowledge
which is not protected by monopoly rights is in the public domain and thus
freely available. This is very unfortunate because it gives the impression that the
work of the managers of biodiversity is deprived of value but the work carried
out in laboratories is the only work that adds value to the final product. Within
the patent system, farmers and other local actors contribute to the research eﬀort
of others without being attributed any right to their work.61
Second, farmers’ knowledge is often less individualistic than scientific knowledge
produced in laboratories. Even if it is usually possible to identify one specific
individual as having made a specific contribution to a given technical or scientific
development, it is in most cases unlikely that s/he will be the exclusive innovator.
This is one reason why monopoly rights which channel all the benefits to a
single inventor are inadequate, since they marginalize or even negate the
contribution of the diﬀerent actors present, and will inevitably limit or stop free
access to the invention by other users. In the agricultural sector, problems arise
from allocating all the benefits of a given invention to a single actor. At the local
level, similar or close varieties may have been developed in diﬀerent areas or
countries by diﬀerent communities, and the patent system is by definition
incapable of assigning rights to a diverse range of actors. Further, the fact that
the first claimant receives all the benefits implies a race to the finish between
diﬀerent innovators. Forcing all actors to compete for the same unique prize
implies that farmers and multinational companies have the same capacity to
benefit from the system. In practice, farmers cannot derive any benefits from
such a system.
Third, monopoly rights in agriculture generally foster the commercialization
of a number of major agricultural inputs. One the most direct impacts of patents
is to raise the price of patented seeds compared to other seeds. Further, while
patents on seeds only give patentees rights on seeds, impacts are in practice far
more wide-ranging. Farmers become not only dependent on private firms for
their seeds but also for such other inputs as pesticides and fertilizers.62 This is
exemplified by recent developments in genetic engineering where some firms
have developed seeds which are predisposed to react favourably to the application
of their own herbicide.63 As shown by the example of some countries, patenting
59 Cf. M.V. Rao, “Viewpoint of public sector plant breeding institutions”, in M.S. Swaminathan
(ed.), Agrobiodiversity and Farmers’ Rights 136 (New Delhi, 1996).
60 Cf. N.S. Gopalakrishnan, “Impact of patent system on traditional knowledge”, XXII Cochin
U.L. Rev. 219 (1998).
61 Cf. D. Wood, “Comment”, in M.S. Swaminathan (ed.), Agrobiodiversity and Farmers’ Rights 128
(New Delhi, 1996).
62 See, e.g., V. Shiva, Future of Our Seeds, Future of Our Farmer—Agricultural Biodiversity, Intellectual
Property Rights and Farmers’ Rights (New Delhi: Research Foundation for Science, Technology and
Natural Resource Policy, 1996).
63 See, e.g., J. Mendelson, “Roundup: The world’s biggest-selling herbicide”, 28/5 Ecologist 270
(1998).
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in agriculture may eventually lead to the integration of a majority of steps in
the food production system.64
Fourth, monopoly rights have generally not been known to foster conservation
of biological diversity or to promote its sustainable use.65 In general, patented
varieties have the tendency to displace local varieties and to foster monocultures.66
This leads in turn to a loss of agro-biodiversity in cases where farmers cease
maintaining existing local varieties.
Finally, it is striking that it is not only subsistence farmers who are at risk.
Indeed, as noted by IPGRI in countries with scanty internal breeding capacity,
the entry of multinational companies active in this field is unlikely to foster
directly the development of domestic industrial capacity.67 It is thus unlikely that
domestic breeding industries would substantially benefit from the introduction
of monopoly rights. The fact that an overwhelming majority of applications for
plant breeders’ rights in both South Africa and Kenya comes from foreign
institutions is a case in point.
L  I C  D  P V
P
While a number of sub-Saharan African countries have taken steps towards
complying with their TRIPS obligations in the field of plant variety protection,
there has been relatively little debate in these countries concerning the
appropriateness of introducing monopoly rights, such as plant breeders’ rights.
In contrast, the controversy over the introduction of intellectual property rights
in agriculture and other fields such as pharmaceuticals has been significant in
India. India’s importance in this debate is linked to a number of elements. It
has been one of a few developing countries where significant debate has taken
place over a long period of time concerning the introduction of monopoly
intellectual property rights brought about by the TRIPS Agreement. Further,
the Patents Act of 1970 endeavoured to balance the commercial incentives given
to the private sector with the public interest, in particular where the fulfilment
of basic needs was concerned. The patentability of any method of agriculture
or horticulture was, for instance, prohibited.68 This implies that the patents
regime must now be significantly modified to be in compliance with TRIPS.
Generally, developments towards compliance with TRIPS in India have been
carefully monitored by WTO member states because of the significant resistance
to changes within the country and because of its importance among developing
64 Concerning the USA, see, e.g., N.D. Hamilton, “Why own the farm if you can own the farmer
(and the crop)?—Contract production and intellectual property protection of grain crops”, 73 Nebraska
L. Rev. 48 (1994).
65 See, e.g., D. Leskien and M. Flitner, Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options
for a Sui Generis System (Rome: International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, 1997).
66 See, e.g., Suman Sahai, “What is bt and what is terminator?”, XXXIV/3–4 Econ. & Pol. Wkly
84 (1999).
67 See International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Key Questions for Decision-Makers—Protection
of Plant Varieties under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Rome:
IPGRI, 1999).
68 India, s. 3 of the Patents Act, 1970 (before changes necessary for TRIPS compliance).
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countries.69 In the field of plant variety protection, the necessity to develop a
response to article 27.3(b) TRIPS has led to a number of proposals by
governmental and non-governmental institutions, and experience gained in India
is of significant relevance to African countries. While India is much larger than
any African country, there are significant points of comparison. This includes,
in particular, the importance of agriculture as a direct source of food needs for
a majority of the population and the importance of the primary sector in terms
of employment.
National legislative proposals
The Indian government has introduced three bills that relate directly or
indirectly to plant variety protection. The first is an amendment to the Patents
Act, 1970, which seeks to broadly put India in conformity with its TRIPS
obligations. When adopted, this amendment will fundamentally alter the character
of the patent legislation, which was based on the need to balance the granting
of monopoly rights with provisions to ensure that these rights were not used in
a way detrimental to the public at large, and with specific exclusions in some
fields related to the fulfilment of basic needs such as health and food. In other
words, while the 1970 Act accepted some aspects of the monopoly inherent in
the patent system, it sought to contain and discipline them.70 The amendment
to the Patents Act does not deal directly with plant varieties but it will have
significant impacts in this field through the expansion of the scope of patentability
brought about by the TRIPS Agreement.
The second bill is the Plant Variety Protection Bill.71 It mainly purports to
introduce plant breeders’ rights providing protection to varieties developed by
commercial breeders. The Bill does not attempt to provide an indigenous
definition of these rights but derives its provisions nearly word for word from
the UPOV Convention. The title of the Bill implies that it provides in equal
measure for farmers’ and plant breeders’ rights. In reality, it devotes a single
short provision to the definition of farmers’ rights. The Bill only protects the
rights of farmers to save, use, exchange, share or sell their farm produce of a
protected variety. In other words, the Bill only grants farmers rights over
the crops they grow. By contrast, the draft revised International Undertaking
recognizes that farmers’ rights include the protection of traditional knowledge,
the right to participate in sharing the benefits arising from the use of plant varieties
and the right to participate in decision-making concerning their management. It
also recognizes that, at a minimum, no limits should be put on the rights that
farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating
material.
69 India has, for instance, already been taken twice to the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms
for failing to implement one specific provision of TRIPS concerning product patents on pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products. See India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (US complaint), Report of the Panel, 5 September, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/
DS50/R; India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (US
complaint), Report of the Appellate Body, 19 December, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R and
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (EC complaint),
Report of the Panel, 24 August, 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS79/R.
70 See, e.g., R. Dhavan and M. Prabhu, “Patent monopolies and free trade: Basic contradiction
in Dunkel draft”, 37 J. Indian L. Institute 194 (1995).
71 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 1999, Bill No. 123 of 1999.
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The third bill of relevance to plant variety protection is the Biological Diversity
Bill.72 This Bill is not a direct response to the TRIPS Agreement but rather to
the CBD. Its main intent is to regulate access to biological resources. Even
though it stops short of clearly defining property rights over these resources, a
number of provisions are of direct relevance to plant variety protection. The
Bill generally takes the position that monopoly rights, in particular patents, have
been recognized at the international level, and that the most a country like India
can do is to try to regulate access by foreigners to its resources and knowledge.
In this context, the Bill seeks to discipline the intellectual property rights regime
by stating that anyone wishing to apply for a monopoly right in India should
first obtain permission from the National Biodiversity Authority.73 The Bill’s
most innovative provision with regard to intellectual property is section 21,
which authorizes the Authority to grant joint ownership of intellectual property
rights either to itself or to an actor having contributed to the invention where
s/he can be identified. It is noteworthy that this is part of the measures the
Authority takes to put in practice benefit sharing. The Bill includes other
provisions which are problematic with regard to the allocation of property rights
over biological resources. Thus, even though benefit sharing includes the sharing
of the property rights at stake, it is significant that local innovators do not have
a right to this allocation and that the Authority remains the final arbiter over
the allocation of property rights.
Other proposals and activities
Non-governmental actors, both activists and researchers, have made a number
of proposals to react and adapt to the WTO regime. Generally, these proposals
focus on the introduction of monopoly rights mandated by the TRIPS Agreement
and propose ways to fight or adapt to it. The extension of the patents regime
to India is thus often taken as a given,74 and relatively little eﬀort has gone into
devising alternatives to monopoly rights. Existing proposals range from trying
to extend the benefits of the patents system to new actors to lessening the
consequences of introducing patents on biological resources.
Proposals have been made to alter the patent system so that it recognizes the
informal and communal system of innovation which characterizes the ways
through which farmers and indigenous communities produce, select and breed
diverse crops and livestock varieties.75 In practice, this implies the recognition of
collective intellectual property rights. Generally, these proposals do not question
the patents system itself but seek to broaden its purview to new actors. The
rationale for doing so is to stop “normal” patentees such as multinational
companies from acquiring monopoly rights on inventions realized partly by
others. One such proposal is the privately proposed Biodiversity (Rights and
Protection) Bill, 1998, which proposes the establishment of biodiversity-related
community intellectual rights.76 It proposes the development of the same
72 Biological Diversity Bill, 2000, Bill No. 93 of 2000.
73 S. 6 of the Biological Diversity Bill, above, n. 72. Note, however, that this provision does not
apply in the case of patents.
74 Cf. M. Gadgil, “A framework for managing India’s biodiversity resources in the context of
CBD and GATT”, 1/1 R/S Biotechnology & Dev. Rev. 1 (1997).
75 See, e.g., Shiva, above, n. 62.
76 See Biodiversity (Rights and Protection) Bill, 1998 (New Delhi: Research Foundation for
Science, Technology and Ecology & Lawyers Collective, 1998).
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monopoly rights previously used to foster the development of a seed industry to
exclude current holders of monopoly rights and the allocation of similar monopoly
rights to local communities.
Another set of proposals focuses on practical activities such as the creation of
biodiversity registers. Some of the rationales for these registers are to document
existing knowledge to stop patent claims from being accepted in other jurisdictions
because of a lack of written description and to levy charges on bioprospecting
or royalties on the commercial use of the materials or knowledge. These registers
have gained in prominence in recent years because of patent applications
filed abroad concerning biodiversity-related knowledge coming specifically from
India.77 A number of schemes have been proposed in the last few years. One
noteworthy example is the case of the village of Pattuvam in Kerala, which
undertook to register natural resources and knowledge pertaining to these
resources found within the village. One of the distinguishing features of this
register is that it is accompanied by a People’s Biodiversity Declaration which
outlines the aims for the existence of a register in very clear terms.78 The
Declaration first asserts that no monopoly claims on life forms will be accepted
by people living in this area. It further adds that life forms, seeds, cells, genes
or properties of life forms, regardless of whether these life forms are known to
local inhabitants or not, or whether they are being used through direct knowledge
or not, shall under no circumstances be subjected to patents or other monopoly
rights. Other provisions detail, for example, the conditions under which
experiments on life forms collected in the territory of Pattuvam can be undertaken.
The register and its accompanying declaration are thus used to assert local people’s
rights over resources found in their territory and the knowledge concerning the
management of these resources. Further, the villagers have decided to keep the
register secret and to allow information sharing only in exceptional cases. The
register is thus not drawn up to foster the commercial exploitation of local
resources by others but mainly to stop others from asserting rights over prior
local knowledge.
As a corollary to the setting up of biodiversity registers, the development of
benefit-sharing schemes has been proposed. Benefit sharing is generally linked
to the idea that the knowledge of farmers and local communities is not susceptible
to fulfilling patenting criteria or even that it should not be included in the patent
system. A form of compensation, often in monetary form, has been proposed
instead of property rights. Benefit sharing is proposed as an instrument to ward
oﬀ biopiracy, which provides no compensation or recognition of local people’s
knowledge whatsoever. Benefit sharing has often been linked to the compilation
of biodiversity registers. In practice it has, for instance, been suggested that the
use of all public domain information derived from biodiversity registers should
77 One of the most controversial has been a patent on turmeric. In this case, two US-based
researchers applied for a patent on the use of turmeric in wound healing in the US. The alleged
invention related to the use of turmeric to augment the healing process of chronic and acute wounds.
This patent was challenged by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research on the ground that
the alleged invention was actually part of public domain knowledge in India. The patent was re-
examined and all the claims cancelled. See US Patent No. 5,401,504, Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing,
issued 28 March, 1995.
78 The following description of the Declaration is based on an English translation by M. Kumar
of the original Malayalam text.
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be acknowledged in a patent application.79 This acknowledgement constitutes
the basis for the establishment of a fund that can be constituted partly of the
royalties received by a given company having drawn on information contained
in a register. In cases where a single person or community is the holder of the
knowledge at stake, the fund can directly reward them. In other cases where the
source of the knowledge is not certain enough or too widespread, the fund would
be used for the general interest.
Apart from policy proposals, it is significant that farmers have also evolved
strategies to cope with what is locally perceived as the negative side eﬀects of
the green revolution, such as loss of diversity. Seed saving and seed exchanges
have been a common practice for many years. One noteworthy example is that
of the Save the Seeds Movement.80 This organization is made up of a group of
farmers of the Garhwal region of northwest Uttar Pradesh who took up the
challenge of saving and promoting local varieties. The immediate trigger for
setting up the group was a major drought in 1986–88, coupled with pest
epidemics, which highlighted some of the major weaknesses of the modern
varieties that had been spreading fast in the valleys of the region.81 The premise
for the work of these farmers is to freely exchange the seeds they collect with
other farmers, both within the district and with other farmers throughout the
country. They do not sell their seeds, though they may market the products of
the crop obtained with these seeds.
Lessons learnt
The Indian experience is rich in lessons for the development of property rights
regimes in African countries. First, it is apparent that none of the proposals
reviewed constitutes a real alternative to patents, which could be used as the
basis for the development of a sui generis regime. While the proposed plant variety
legislation fundamentally introduces monopoly rights for formal plant breeders,
other proposals have mostly evolved within the paradigm oﬀered by the patents
system. The proposal to introduce patents for local communities constitutes a
significant conceptual endeavour, since it seeks to extend the benefits of the
patent system to actors who have not usually been able to benefit from it. In
theory, it would allow all relevant actors to benefit from the same property
rights. However, it is highly unrealistic to expect that the patent system can
deliver such benefits. Indeed, as long as one operates within a monopoly rights
system that only rewards state-of-the-art knowledge, it is unlikely that local
communities will substantially benefit from this new opportunity. This is due to
the fact that formal breeders will always have the capacity to innovate faster
than local farmers and will thus easily be able to appropriate claims of novelty.
79 See, e.g., G. Utkarsh et al, “Intellectual property rights on biological resources: Benefiting from
biodiversity and people’s knowledge’, 77 Current Science 1418 (1999) and Gadgil, above, n. 74.
80 See, e.g., V. Jhardari, “Involving farmers in the on farm conservation of crop genetic resources:
A history of save the seeds’ movement in Garhwal, Indian Himalayas”, in T. Partap and B. Sthapit
(eds.), Managing Agrobiodiversity: Farmers’ Changing Perspectives and Institutional Responses in the Hindu Kush-
Himalayan Region 351 (Kathmandu: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development,
1998). See also, I. Khurana, “The seed supremo”, 7/15 Down to Earth (31 Dec., 1998).
81 See, e.g., V. Singh, “Organizing mountain farmers to carry out in situ conservation of their
agricultural resources’ diversity”, in T. Partap and B. Sthapit (eds.), Managing Agrobiodiversity: Farmers’
Changing Perspectives and Institutional Responses in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Region 341 (Kathmandu:
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, 1998).
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Biodiversity registers constitute an excellent tool to counter unwarranted patent
applications. They provide written support to claims that knowledge already
exists and can therefore not be patented as being “state-of-the-art”.82 Further,
they can serve as an extremely useful source of knowledge for all farmers in case
access is oﬀered to other farming communities, and they may contribute to
revitalizing the farmer’s role as a breeder. However, in the context of the
development of a sui generis system, registers are not appropriate models because
they are specifically promoted to counter the threat of patents. In other words,
they constitute a defensive strategy which helps to mitigate the impacts of the
international patents system on local farmers and communities, but do not
constitute an alternative to patents. While registers can be very eﬀective to
counter patent claims by others on knowledge held locally, they cannot stop the
utilization of genes from plants produced in a given village by outsiders who will
then be able to patent novel products and processes. Further, registers are not
associated with any rights on the knowledge recorded. Rather, the registers are
meant to show that what is recorded is public knowledge and therefore not
patentable. Farmers and local communities are thereby denied any rights to
their knowledge.
The benefit-sharing strategy has also been proposed to reduce the impact of
patents on farmers and local communities. Indeed, it constitutes a useful strategy
to eliminate biopiracy which is marked by the absence of any acknowledgement,
compensation or benefit sharing. However, even though the definition of benefit
sharing is often very broad, it is in practice often limited to monetary
compensation. In eﬀect, this kind of benefit sharing legalizes and legitimizes the
dispossession of local people’s rights over their resources and their knowledge.
To avoid biopiracy, it sacrifices farmers and local communities’ rights.
The fact that all the policy proposals focus either on the introduction of
monopoly rights or on ways to fight some of the undesirable impacts of the
patents system illustrates some of the diﬃculties that the development of an
alternative sui generis system implies. It is significant that despite the significant
debates that have taken place concerning the strengthening of intellectual property
rights that are being imposed on India by TRIPS, the main focus of interest has
remained on patents. This can be explained in part by the fact that patents are
the benchmark against which other systems are compared in TRIPS, but also
by the fact that the most innovative actors in this field were opposed to the
TRIPS Agreement and thus focused for several years on ways to avoid it
altogether. It is likely that article 27.3(b) did not appear to be of any special
interest after the signature of TRIPS, which was a major defeat for developing
countries, in particular for countries like India where the Patents Act was
extremely restrictive. This should not stop African countries from using the
possibilities oﬀered concerning plant variety protection to their full extent.
Another lesson which can be learnt from the Indian experience concerns the
response that countries must give to their various international commitments.
India, like most WTO member states, is also a party to the CBD. While the
development of two diﬀerent acts concerning plant varieties and biodiversity
reflects the division apparent at the international level between TRIPS and the
82 They may be especially useful if the case of patent applications in the US where novelty is
judged only against published materials, where the application relates to foreign knowledge. See
United States Code, Title 35—Patents, 35 USC 102.
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Convention, there is no substantive reason to justify this choice. Indeed, the
Convention provides a broad framework for the management of biological
resources and for the allocation of property rights to these resources and related
knowledge. Plant varieties only constitute one specific subset of biological resources
which could be the object of a separate section in a broad biodiversity management
law. The need for more integrated legislative developments is, for instance,
apparent in the fact that the two Acts each set up a separate national authority
to oversee the implementation of each act. Countries which are still in the
process of developing responses to both agreements should endeavour to adopt
one encompassing piece of legislation.
The Indian experience also indicates that developments at the local level
should be considered more carefully by policy makers. The two cases, briefly
reviewed above, of activities initiated at the local level show that farmers and
village communities do have answers to the problems posed by the introduction
of monopoly intellectual rights or by the introduction of new varieties of crops.
Their responses indicate clearly that monopolies are not the answer to the type
of problems they face. While local communities and farmers may be tempted
to restrict access to their knowledge if they feel threatened by the imposition of
an alien property rights system, the case of the Save the Seeds Movement clearly
illustrates the importance of sharing knowledge and resources in agricultural
management. These initiatives, or similar endeavours in African countries, which
may or may not be direct responses to international treaties, should be carefully
integrated in the legislative framework to be designed.
Overall, the Indian example indicates that even in a country where significant
attention has been given to issues surrounding the introduction of intellectual
property rights in agriculture, local responses have not fully evolved. Further
research on these issues is called for to allow African countries to develop
property rights regimes over plant varieties that are fully adapted to their needs
and conditions.
D S G P V P  A
TRIPS provides that member states can protect plant varieties either through
patents or an alternative system (sui generis system). A number of reasons militate
in favour of taking advantage of this exception. First, in most sub-Saharan
countries, agriculture is a sector of primary importance. Further, a large part of
agricultural activities is subsistence agriculture. This implies that agricultural
management is carried out by a variety of actors who include a large number
of subsistence farmers. More generally, there is a close link between agriculture
and the fulfilment of the food needs of all individuals. Acts adopted to implement
TRIPS obligations should thus be drafted to reflect African countries’ specific
socio-economic conditions. In the current framework where commercial
agriculture only provides a relatively small part of overall agricultural production,
it is highly unlikely that a property rights model developed for countries
with highly commercialized and comparatively small agricultural sectors would
constitute an appropriate response.83
83 Cf. International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, above, n. 68, acknowledging that “an IPR
suitable for an industrialized system of agricultural production, geared towards export, is unlikely to
be appropriate for an agricultural sector characterized primarily by subsistence farming”.
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The introduction of a sui generis system undoubtedly constitutes a challenge
for all African countries that are members of the WTO. While there seems to
be widespread agreement in developing countries that patents are not appropriate
in agriculture, a number of countries have been led to think that the model
provided by UPOV is substantially diﬀerent from patents. Relatively little
conceptual work has gone into defining an alternative to monopoly rights. This
is due to two main factors. First, while most countries operated on the basis of
the free sharing of knowledge in the pre-TRIPS era, developing countries have
not had much time to devise entirely new systems that had not been experimented
with elsewhere.84 Second, there has been significant pressure on developing
countries to join UPOV to fulfil their obligations under article 27.3(b) TRIPS.
Even though the deadline for implementing the agreement is now passed for
African countries classified as developing countries, a number of them are yet
to adopt plant variety protection regimes. Countries should use this opportunity
to rethink their needs with regard to plant variety protection and adopt regimes
which will benefit the majority of their population in the long term.
A sui generis plant variety property rights system should aim at fulfilling a
number of goals. First, it should seek to foster food security for all individuals.
As noted, aggregate increases in food production brought about by the green
revolution have helped countries such as India to become self-suﬃcient. However,
this quantitative increase has not been associated with similar improvements in
the distribution of existing food supplies. It is thus imperative that the introduction
of plant variety protection should not contribute to the same lopsided results but
rather promote the fulfilment of basic needs for all. Secondly, a sui generis system
should also contribute to sustainable agricultural management.85 This implies
that it should promote types of agricultural management which can be sustained
in the long term, which do not lead to the erosion of the genetic base and which
are adapted to local climatic conditions. Third, it should more generally contribute
to the development of crops which do not harm the environment. It is therefore
important that states include biosafety provisions as part of their legislations.
The Indian plant variety bill is noteworthy in this regard since it includes a
provision banning the registration of varieties containing genes or gene sequences
involving technologies that are injurious to the life or health of human beings,
plants or animals.86 Fourth, a sui generis plant variety protection system should
not be developed in isolation. Plant varieties are only a subset of biological
resources and all countries that are members of the WTO and the CBD should
aim at drafting a single all-encompassing law which takes into account CBD
and TRIPS requirements.
The previous sections have shown that monopoly rights such as patents and
plant breeders’ rights do not seem to provide frameworks which can foster the
goals just outlined. A sui generis system aiming at providing food security at the
individual level and broadly fostering sustainable environmental management
84 Indeed, the African group argued in 1999 that developing countries should be given another
five years to implement art. 27.3(b). See World Trade Organization, The TRIPS Agreement:
Communication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/302, 6
August, 1999.
85 Cf. art. 1 of the CBD, above, n. 12. See also, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/302, above, n. 84, in
which the African Group calls for the harmonization of art. 27.3(b) TRIPS with the provisions of
the CBD and the International Undertaking.
86 S. 14.2 of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 1999, Bill No. 123 of
1999.
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should therefore establish property rights whose holders are not limited to one
specific category of actor involved in agricultural management. Agricultural
management is carried out by a multitude of stakeholders, and a system providing
entitlements to all relevant actors should therefore be proposed. Further, an
alternative system should recognize that the diﬀerent actors do not all have
the same motivation for innovating. While commercial incentives may be
overwhelming for some categories of agricultural managers, this is not the case
of all. Overall, a sui generis system is not one that excludes any category of actors
from its purview, but rather it is a system which focuses on broadening the range
of rights holders.
The sui generis systems envisaged under article 27.3(b) were not defined during
the negotiations. Some elements can nevertheless be derived from the text. First,
it implies the allocation of property rights. Forms of financial compensation
which are being proposed under the guise of benefit sharing instead of property
rights thus cannot constitute the core of a sui generis system.87 Second, it is clear
from the text that the drafters meant the sui generis system to be an alternative
to patents. This alternative is by definition an intellectual property rights system
because it is knowledge which is protected but it is an alternative to monopoly
rights. A number of developing states have already taken advantage of the
proposition that the patentability of plant varieties can be excluded, but they
have been less successful in devising alternatives. Indeed, if the possibility to
reject patentability is a significant step in the right direction, it is insuﬃcient. A
more substantive step is to use the sui generis option to reject all monopoly rights,
whether patents proposed by TRIPS or plant breeders’ rights proposed by
UPOV.88
The rejection of monopoly rights does not imply the rejection or promotion
of any model of agricultural development. Indeed, the issue is not whether
citizens of developing countries are for or against genetically engineered seeds
and whether farmers will benefit or not from these varieties. What is fundamentally
at stake is the allocation of property rights. The allocation of intellectual property
rights is as fundamental as the allocation of land rights. Indeed, it has been
repeatedly pointed out that the question of hunger has primarily been a question
of land (re)distribution. The introduction of intellectual property rights in the
management of biodiversity will have exactly the same drawbacks if the allocation
of property rights is not undertaken specifically with a view to fostering the
realization of everyone’s basic food needs.
In practice, a number of strategies can be used by African states to provide
plant variety protection as required by TRIPS, but under conditions which do
not threaten their interests and the interests of their population. First, they can
replicate a solution proposed in the context of the interpretative resolutions to
the International Undertaking, by recognizing concurrently and equally the
rights of farmers and the rights of commercial breeders. The fundamental
element is that the two sets of rights should both have the same importance.
Legislation, such as the African model legislation, which puts on the same level
87 Proposals aiming at “converting rights into financial rewards” do not qualify as sui generis
systems. Cf. M. Geetha Rani, “Community gene banks sustain food security and farmers’ rights”,
41 Biotechnology & Dev. Monitor 19 (2000).
88 Interestingly, even though the regime proposed does not fully match this provision, the African
Model Legislation, above, n. 22, provides in its preamble that patenting or the exclusive appropriation
of any life form violates the fundamental human right to life.
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local communities, farmers and breeders, heads in the right direction. However,
the rights provided to farmers and local communities must be as strict as the
rights oﬀered to breeders if these statements are to go beyond rhetoric. To take
the example of the model law, the substance of the law does not match the
principles enunciated at the outset. Local communities can, for instance, only
prohibit access to their biological resources and related knowledge where this is
detrimental to the integrity of their natural or cultural heritage.89 The balance
between the property rights of farmer breeders and commercial breeders is also
not attained if the only right farmers have is to be able to charge a fee from
commercial breeders when their varieties are used.90
The concurrent recognition of the rights of various actors is not suﬃcient in
itself. Indeed, in many cases, commercial breeders use material or knowledge
developed by other actors. In terms of property rights, it may be necessary in
these cases to allocate rights jointly. Where no specific inventor can be identified,
a public authority at the national or international level may become the joint
owner of the variety with a mandate to use the variety to further socio-economic
goals.91 If the variety is of a staple food crop, this would allow its dissemination
at the lowest possible cost to all farmers.
A more evolved property-rights system than a simple transposition of the
principles of the International Undertaking would be to define the entitlements
of all actors in plant breeding and agricultural management. This would include
not only farmers and commercial breeders, but also local communities, indigenous
peoples and national agricultural research institutes. Entitlements should be
provided to each actor, and they should generally not be exclusionary since most
of the knowledge and resources which are used are derived from some other
source maintained by human beings. In this situation, none of the entitlements
can prevent other actors from carrying on their activities.
Apart from the allocation of property rights to the various actors involved in
plant variety management, states also have a number of tools at their disposal
to influence the impacts of the property-rights regime set up. They can, for
instance, limit the number of varieties that can be protected for commercial use.
Thus, to foster the fulfilment of basic food needs, it would be possible to prohibit
the registration by commercial breeders of any cultivated species used to meet
those food needs.92 The response of the CGIAR Centres faced with similar issues
is also relevant here. While their mission remains to foster the management of
genetic resources in order to help eradicate poverty, increase food security and
protect the environment, they must do so in a world where private monopoly
rights are gaining an increasingly important position. Until recently, the
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) gave a very interesting
answer to this problem by stating that it did not believe monopoly rights had
necessarily to be used in a monopolistic way. Accordingly, intellectual property
89 Art. 20 of the African Model Legislation, above, n. 22.
90 See, e.g., Art. 5 of the proposed Convention of Farmers and Breeders (New Delhi: Gene
Campaign, 1998).
91 Note that the Indian biodiversity bill proposes that the national biodiversity authority could
grant joint ownership of a patent either to itself or to identified contributors to the development of
a given invention. See Biological Diversity Bill, 2000, Bill No. 93 of 2000.
92 A similar proposal was made by the Law Commission of India. See 171st Report on Biodiversity
Bill (New Delhi: Law Commission of India, 2000).
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rights were to be used only when the material would be used for the benefit of
the poor in developing countries.93
Another strategy that can be used to influence the practical impacts of a given
property rights regime is to allocate diﬀerent durations to diﬀerent rights. In a
situation where plant breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights are recognized as equal
rights, it is possible to foster broader development policy goals by reducing the
duration of commercial breeders’ rights as much as possible and extending
farmers’ rights as far as possible. The reduction of commercial breeders’ rights
is something that had been successfully implemented, for instance, in the Indian
Patents Act of 1970, which provided that the duration of patents on processes
of manufacture for substances intended for use as food would be half the normal
term.94
The allocation of rights may remain ineﬀective in practice if the rights holders
are not aware of their rights and the duties of other rights holders. Thus, if a
variety is used by a breeder to develop a variety with diﬀerent traits in a
laboratory for which a monopoly right is sought, the international intellectual
property rights regime normally takes the view that the claim is to be upheld
unless someone contests the claim. In the case of plant varieties and related
knowledge, this proves to be extremely problematic both at the international
and domestic levels. At the international level, several cases linked to knowledge
and biological resources from India have highlighted the limitations of the current
system, which puts the burden of proof entirely on the party contesting the
claim. While a few patents have been successfully contested in Europe and the
United States,95 these constitute only a fraction of all the patents that are
controversial.96 At the domestic level, farmers or local communities may face
similar problems if they want to contest the registration of a variety by a
commercial breeder. The proposed Indian plant variety legislation intimates, for
instance, that it is for the people who think a registered variety builds partly on
their own resources or knowledge to file a claim.97 To counter these problems,
national legislation could, for instance, provide that the burden of proof should
be on the defendant.
As noted, the development of plant variety protection to comply with TRIPS
does not occur in a vacuum. Most countries have other international obligations
in this field. The CBD is central in this regard since it constitutes the main
instrument concerned with biological resources. Further, it acknowledges the
potential impacts of intellectual property rights on biodiversity management and
even gives specific guidance to member states by stating that they should ensure
that such intellectual property rights are supportive of and do not run counter
93 See IPGRI Policy on Intellectual Property, 11 March, 1999 (now superseded by a March 2000
policy).
94 See s. 53 of the Patents Act, 1970 (before changes necessary for TRIPS compliance).
95 See, e.g., US Patent No. 5,401,504, Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing, issued 28 March, 1995.
96 The relatively low number of patents contested is explained in part by the cost involved in
filing oppositions and the diﬃculties linked to the necessity to file where the patent was applied for.
The case of US patent No. 5,663,484 concerning basmati rice illustrates this well. Before submitting
its case in the US, the Indian government already assembled some 1,500 pages of material to be
able to counter each of the claims made. See, e.g. R. Ramachandran, “Challenging the basmati
patent”, 17/10 Frontline 79 (2000). See also, WTO, Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional
Knowledge—The Indian Experience, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/156—IP/C/W/198, 14 July, 2000.
97 See art. 48 of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 1999, Bill No. 123 of
1999.
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to the objectives of the Convention.98 Since states have to comply with all their
international obligations concurrently and most WTO member states are parties
to the CBD, it is imperative that a plant variety protection regime should also
comply with states’ other environmental commitments. It is thus of the utmost
importance that member states adopt legislation concerning the management of
biological resources that covers all relevant aspects. This implies that a plant
variety protection regime should not normally be a separate piece of legislation.
Plant varieties are only a subset of all biological resources which should be
covered under an act for the implementation of the CBD. Situations where
diﬀerent national authorities for plant variety protection and for biodiversity
with varying and/or overlapping mandates are set up, as in the case of India,
should be avoided. In principle, there should be a generic regime for the
management of all biological resources, which may include a specific sub-section
concerning plant varieties where required by the subject matter or by the TRIPS
Agreement.
Article 27.3(b) TRIPS focuses on the specific issue of plant varieties. There
are, however, a number of other areas, in particular health, where TRIPS does
not allow the development of a sui generis system even though the need for an
alternative to patents in most developing countries is glaring. The benefits that
developing countries can derive from a sui generis system in agriculture should
push them to demand the same in the field of health. Finally, even if TRIPS is
not modified in the next few years to accommodate more exceptions to
patentability, the relevance of sui generis protection will remain. Indeed, in the
context of the CBD, all developing countries will have to consider ways to
regulate the management of biological resources and associated knowledge within
their countries. The calls for the establishment of sui generis systems to protect
traditional knowledge constitute part of the challenges that developing countries
will have to tackle.99 The issues they will face in terms of property rights in the
context of the CBD are substantively similar to the issues outlined in this article
concerning plant variety protection under TRIPS. Even if some countries decide
to evade the debate for now in the context of their TRIPS obligations, they will
have to consider these issues in the near future in the broader context of the
CBD.
98 Art. 16.5 of the CBD, above, n. 12.
99 See, e.g., art. 8( j) and Related Provisions, Dec. V/16, in Report of the Fifth Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nairobi, 15–26 May, 2000,
UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23.
